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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Rosa L. Greub appeals from her conviction for possession of
methamphetamine.

Specifically, she challenges the denial of her motion to

suppress evidence.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Greub with possession of methamphetamine.

(R.,

pp. 49-50.) She moved to suppress evidence “obtained by officers resulting from
defendant’s contact with Pocatello Police.” (R., pp. 51-52.) After a hearing on
the motion (Tr., pp. 5-46), the district court made the following factual findings:
Defendant Rosa L. Greub (“Defendant”) was parked in a parking lot
in Pocatello between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on June 10, 2016,
when Officer Christ of the Pocatello Police Department drove into
the parking lot to complete an accident report. Upon entering,
Officer Christ saw Defendant’s car in the back corner of the parking
lot and saw her stare at him in what he perceived to be a startled
manner. Officer Christ parked his patrol car perpendicular to
Defendant’s car, either 23 feet or 15 yards away, and did not have
his interior [sic] lights flashing.
Officer Christ, in uniform,
approached Defendant to ask her what her business was there.
Defendant replied that she was on her way to work, but stopped to
smoke a cigarette because her employer did not allow its
employees to smoke on the premises. Officer Christ did not see a
cigarette and saw that Defendant was wearing a uniform.
Officer Christ asked her [to] provide her driver’s license, which she
could not provide. Instead Defendant provided an identification
card and confirmed that the address on it was current. Officer
Christ next asked if she had “anything illegal,” such as alcohol,
drugs, or prescription medications, to which Defendant responded
that she did not. Defendant testified at the hearing that Officer
Christ persisted in asking her if she had anything illegal, and asked
“If I look in your vehicle, will I find anything?” Officer Christ testified
that he asked Defendant if he could search her vehicle and that
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Defendant said “Sure.” Defendant also testified that she agreed to
Officer Christ searching her car.
During this questioning, Officer Christ observed that Defendant
appeared nervous because she averted her eyes from him. Officer
Christ does not recall when he returned Defendant’s identification
to her.
After Defendant agreed to the search, Officer Christ asked
Defendant to step out of the car, and he called a second unit to
assist him because he was the only officer there and was not sure
whether Defendant had any weapons. Defendant held her purse
as she stepped out of the car, but Officer Christ told her to leave
her purse in the car for safety purposes, which Defendant did.
Before the second officer, Officer Buetts, arrived, Officer Christ
directed Defendant to stand in front of his patrol car while he began
searching the car. By the center console between the driver’s seat
and passenger seat, Officer Christ saw a brown paper bag with the
red cap of what he perceived to be a whiskey bottle protruding from
the top. He noted that the seal had been broken.
At this time, Officer Christ stopped his search and talked with
Defendant about the bottle he found in her car because he wanted
backup before proceeding any further. He testified that it [was]
standard procedure for a second officer to stay with the person
while the other officer conducts the search for safety purposes.
Because it was taking Officer Buetts an extended amount of time to
arrive, Officer Christ decided to continue his search without Officer
Buetts because he did not want to make Defendant late for work.
Officer Christ searched behind the passenger area, then searched
Defendant’s purse in which he found methamphetamine. After
arresting Defendant, Officer Buetts arrived and Officer Christ
searched Defendant’s purse a second time and found a pipe.
(R., pp. 84-86.)
The district court denied the suppression motion.

(R., pp. 84-99.)

Relevant to this appeal, the district court concluded that Greub had given
voluntary consent to search her car and the containers therein, including her
purse, and had not revoked or limited that consent when she initially attempted to
remove the purse from the car. (R., pp. 90-99.)
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Greub entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to challenge
the denial of the suppression motion. (R., pp. 114, 120-21; 10/11/16 Tr., p. 1,
Ls. 12-15.) She filed an appeal timely from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 13638, 142-44.)
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ISSUE
Greub states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Greub’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Greub failed to show clear error in the district court’s finding that she
did not revoke her consent in relation to her purse?
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ARGUMENT
Greub Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s Finding That She
Did Not Revoke Her Consent In Relation To Her Purse
A.

Introduction
The district court held that Greub’s act of grabbing her purse as she

prepared to step out of the car was not an “unequivocal act” revoking her
previously given consent, and “under the circumstances in this case” Greub “did
not revoke her consent.” (R., pp. 93-95.) Citing cases addressing the scope of a
search of a car incident to the arrest of the driver as “instructive,” Greub argues
purses should be granted “special” status such that her grabbing the purse after
she was instructed to exit the car must be interpreted as revocation of consent.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-12.) Greub’s request for a special rule related to purses
is without legal merit, and her argument that the district court erred when it
reviewed all the circumstances fails.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found.” State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
A district court’s finding that consent was not revoked is reviewed to determine if
it was “clearly erroneous.” State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477,
480 (Ct. App. 2004).
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C.

Greub Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s
Determination That Her Act Of Grabbing Her Purse Was Not An Act
Clearly Inconsistent With The Consent She Had Just Given
“A valid consent dispels the necessity for a search warrant. Indeed, it has

been suggested that consent—like the plain view doctrine—dispels application of
the fourth amendment itself.” State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 560, 716 P.2d
1328, 1332 (Ct. App. 1986).

Because the object of the requested search

included drugs (R., pp.85, 92), “it was objectively reasonable for the police to
conclude that the general consent to search [Greub]’s car included consent to
search containers within that car which might bear drugs.” Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).

Greub does not challenge the district court’s

determination that she gave voluntary consent to search her car, including
containers therein. (See, generally, Appellant’s brief.)
“Even if consent has been given, expressly or impliedly, it may be
revoked, thereby terminating the authority of the police to continue a warrantless
search.” Rusho, 110 Idaho at 560, 716 P.2d at 1332. “‘[C]onduct withdrawing
consent must be an act clearly inconsistent with the apparent consent to search,
an unambiguous statement challenging the officer’s authority to conduct the
search, or some combination of both.’” United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768,
774 (8th Cir. 2005) (brackets original) (quoting Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d
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741, 746–47 (D.C. App. 1994) (footnotes omitted)).1 “For example, the closing
and locking a car trunk and the shutting of a bedroom door are acts that courts
have held to be express revocations of consent. Conversely, courts have held
that an equivocal act or statement cannot reasonably be interpreted as
conveying an indication that consent has been withdrawn.” Burton, 657 A.2d at
747 (citing cases). “[E]quivocal conduct can be construed in many different ways
and it, therefore, does not pass muster under an objective reasonableness test.”
Id. at 748 (putting hand over pocket but then removing it when instructed not
unequivocal withdrawal of consent).

See also Sanders, 424 F.3d at 775

(applying unequivocal conduct standard, and finding that blocking the search of a
pocket five times unequivocally withdrew consent).
The district court applied the correct legal standard and concluded Greub
had granted consent to search the entire car, including the purse, and her
conduct of grabbing her purse but then leaving it when instructed “was not clearly
inconsistent with her consent to the search of her car, nor was it a clear and
unequivocal act to prevent Officer Christ from searching her purse.” (R., p. 95.)
Finding the facts of the case closer to Burton than Sanders, the court held that
Greub “did not revoke her consent.” (Id.) The district court’s analysis is correct.
Greub consented to a search of her car for “‘anything illegal’” including
“alcohol, drugs or prescription medications.”

(R., p. 85.)

Such items could

“Effective withdrawal of consent requires unequivocal conduct, in the form of
either an act, statement, or some combination of the two, that is inconsistent with
the consent to the search previously given.” State v. Wellard, No. 43511, 2016
WL 4413238, at *2 (Ct. App. 2016) (unpublished) (citing Burton, 657 A.2d at
748). See also State v. Lawrence, No. 38555, 2011 WL 11067233, at *2
(Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished).
1
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certainly have been in her purse, and thus the purse was within the scope of the
search. (R., pp. 91-92.) After obtaining consent to search, the officer asked
Greub “to step out of the car” so he could conduct the search. (R., pp. 85-86.)
Greub grabbed her purse, but the officer “told her to leave her purse in the car for
safety purposes, which Defendant did.”

(R., p. 86.)

The officer began the

search, and found an open container of alcohol. (Id.) He stopped the search to
discuss what he had found with Greub. (Id.) After discussing the alcohol, the
officer resumed the search, and searched the purse, in which he found
methamphetamine. (Id.)
Under these facts, the act of grabbing the purse after granting consent to
search and after being instructed to step out of the car was, at best, ambiguous.
Grabbing the purse may have been a habitual action undertaken every time
Greub exited the car.

It may have been based on a desire to have or get

something out of the purse (such as a cell phone or cigarettes) while she was
waiting for the search to conclude.

It was not clearly inconsistent with the

consent to search just given, and was therefore not an unequivocal withdrawal or
revocation of that consent.
Moreover, when instructed to not take the purse (for officer safety, not to
alter the scope of the consent), Greub did not articulate any desire that the purse
not be searched.

Nor did she express any withdrawal of consent when the

officer discussed the open container of alcohol he discovered in the initial stages
of the search. The officer’s belief that the purse was still within the scope of the
consent when he searched it was not unreasonable under the facts of this case.
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Greub argues that the fact it was her purse she grabbed, as opposed to
some other container, is enough alone to show the officer no longer reasonably
believed the consent extended to the purse.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-12.)

Specifically, she cites to cases addressing whether the purse of a passenger is
within the scope of a search of a car incident to the arrest of the driver and
contends that whether her purse could be properly searched should hinge on
whether she voluntarily left it in the car after being instructed to exit the vehicle.
(Id.) This argument is not based on the applicable legal standard and does not
withstand analysis.
In State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 979 P.2d 100 (1998) (cited
Appellant’s brief, p. 9), Newsom challenged the district court’s determination that
an officer’s search of her “purse was lawful incident to the arrest of the driver of
the vehicle.” Id. at 699, 979 P.2d at 101. The Court held that the search incident
to arrest exception “does not authorize the search of another occupant of the
automobile merely because the other occupant was there when the arrest
occurred.” Id. at 700, 979 P.2d at 102. The Court noted that Newsom had
testified that the purse was on her lap, but when she tried to take it with her upon
exiting the car the officers ordered she leave it behind.

Id.

Under such

circumstances “the passenger’s purse was entitled to as much privacy and
freedom from search and seizure as the passenger herself.” Id.
The Court also addressed the search of a passenger’s purse incident to
the arrest of the driver in State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000)
(cited Appellant’s brief, p. 10). In that case, however, unlike in Newsom, Holland
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voluntarily left her purse behind when asked to exit the car. Id. at 160, 15 P.3d at
1168. See also State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234-35, 127 P.3d 133, 137-38
(2005) (cited Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11). In reaching the opposite conclusion as
in Newsom, the Court stated that “Newsom stands for the proposition that the
police cannot create a right to search a container by placing it within the
passenger compartment of a car or by ordering someone else to place it there for
them.” Holland, 135 Idaho at 163, 15 P.3d at 1171; see also Watts, 142 Idaho at
235, 127 P.3d at 138 (“Watts is not entitled to the ‘exception to the Belton
exception’ provided in Newsom, in which the officer ordered Newsom to leave
her purse in the car.”).
Greub concludes that the “takeaway from Newsom, Holland, and Watts is
that the police cannot create a right to search by thwarting an individual’s attempt
to restrict the scope of the police’s search.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11 (internal
quotes omitted).) Even assuming the merits of this extrapolation,2 the flaw in this
argument is that it begs the question. Greub consented to a search of her car for
alcohol and drugs, which included consent to search the purse in the car. The
question, then, is not whether the officer “creat[ed] a right to search” the purse by
insisting that Greub not take it with her. This is not what the district court held,
and the state concedes the obvious point that the officer was bound by any
The state does not believe that the cited cases stand for the proposition that a
defendant may unilaterally “restrict the scope of the police’s search,” but rather
merely define the legal scope of the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement. The state sees no obvious reason to expand cases
defining the scope of the search incident to arrest exception to also define the
scope of consent. See State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 357 P.3d 1281
(Ct. App. 2015) (declining to extend the rationale of Newsom to the context of the
automobile exception).
2
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withdrawal of consent. The relevant question is whether Greub withdrew the
previously granted consent by attempting to take the purse with her. Greub does
not argue how the grabbing of the purse was a withdrawal of consent, but merely
assumes it was. (Appellant’s brief, p. 11 (grabbing the purse when being asked
to exit the car “was an attempt to restrict [the] search of it”).)

This mere

assumption falls far short of meeting Greub’s burden of showing clear error in the
district court’s finding that her act of grabbing the purse, under the circumstances
of this case, was not an unequivocal withdrawal of consent.
The district court applied the correct legal standards and concluded that
Greub’s act of grabbing her purse when asked to exit the car was not an act
clearly inconsistent with the previously granted consent to search. Greub does
not challenge this finding as clear error under the relevant legal standards, but
instead requests application of a legal standard that she has failed to show is
relevant. Greub has failed to show clear error by the district court.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Greub’s judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of May, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KKJ/dd

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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